Impagliazzo and Wigderson IW97] have recently shown that if there exists a decision problem solvable in time 2 O(n) and having circuit complexity 2 (n) (for all but nitely many n) then P = BPP. This result is a culmination of a series of works showing connections between the existence of hard predicates and the existence of good pseudorandom generators.
Introduction
This paper continues the exploration of hardness versus randomness trade-o s, that is, results showing that randomized algorithms can be e ciently simulated deterministically if certain complexity-theoretic assumptions are true. We present two new approaches to proving the recent result of Impagliazzo and Wigderson IW97] that, if there is a decision problem computable in time 2 O(n) and having circuit complexity 2 (n) for all but nitely many n, then P = BPP. Impagliazzo and Wigderson prove their result by presenting a \randomness-e cient ampli cation of hardness" based on a derandomized version of Yao's XOR Lemma. The hardness-ampli cation procedure is then composed with the Nisan{Wigderson (NW) generator NW94] and this gives the result. The hardness ampli cation goes through three steps: an encoding using multivariate polynomials (from BFNW93]), a rst derandomized XOR Lemma (from Imp95]) and a second derandomized XOR Lemma (which is the technical contribution of IW97]).
In our rst result, we show how to construct a \pseudoentropy generator" starting from a predicate with \mild" hardness. Roughly speaking, a pseudoentropy generator takes a short random seed as input and outputs a distribution that is indistinguishable from having high min-entropy. Combining our pseudoentropy generator with an extractor, we obtain a pseudorandom generator. Interestingly, our pseudoentropy generator is (a modi cation of) the NW generator itself. Along the way we prove that, when built out of a mildly hard predicate, the NW generator outputs a distribution that is indistinguishable from having high Shannon entropy, a result that has not been observed before. The notion of a pseudoentropy generator, and the idea that a pseudoentropy generator can be converted into a pseudorandom generator using an extractor, are due to H astad et al. HILL98] . 1 Our construction is the rst construction of a pseudorandom generator that works using a mildly hard predicate and without hardness ampli cation.
We then revisit the hardness ampli cation problem, as considered in BFNW93, Imp95, IW97], and we show that the rst step alone (encoding with multivariate polynomials) is su cient to amplify hardness to the desired level, so that the derandomized XOR Lemmas are not necessary in this context. Our proof is based on a list-decoding algorithm for multivariate polynomial codes and exploits the connection between list-decoding and the hardness-ampli cation problems. The list-decoding algorithm described in this paper is quantitatively better than a previous one by Arora and Sudan AS97] , and has a simpler analysis.
An overview of previous results. The works of Blum and Micali BM84] and Yao Yao82] introduce
the notion of a cryptographically strong pseudorandom generator (csPRG) and show how to construct pseudorandom generators based on the existence of one-way permutations. A csPRG is a polynomial-time algorithm that on input a randomly selected string of length n o(1) produces an output of length n that is computationally indistinguishable from uniform by any adversary of poly(n) size. Yao also observes that a given polynomial-time randomized algorithm can be simulated deterministically using a csPRG in time 2 n o(1) poly(n) by trying all the seeds and taking the majority answer.
In a seminal work, Nisan and Wigderson NW94] explore the use of a weaker type of pseudorandom generator (PRG) in order to derandomize randomized algorithm. They observe that, for the purpose of derandomization, one can consider generators computable in time poly(2 t ) (instead of poly(t)) where t is the length of the seed, since the derandomization process cycles through all the seeds, and this induces an overhead factor 2 t anyway. They also observe that one can restrict to generators that are good against adversaries whose running time is bounded by a xed polynomial, instead of every polynomial. They then show how to construct a pseudorandom generator meeting this relaxed de nition under weaker assumptions than those used to build cryptographically strong pseudorandom generators. Furthermore, they show that, under a su ciently strong assumption, one can build a PRG that uses seeds of logarithmic length (which would be impossible for a csPRG). Such a generator can be used to simulate randomized algorithms in polynomial time, and its existence implies P = BPP. The condition under which Nisan and Wigderson prove the existence of a PRG with seeds of logarithmic length is the existence of a decision problem (i.e., a predicate P: f0; 1g n ! f0; 1g) solvable in time 2 O(n) such that for some positive constant no circuit of size 2 n can solve the problem on more than a fraction 1=2 + 2 ? n of the inputs. 2 This is a very strong hardness requirement, and it is of interest to obtain similar conclusions under weaker assumptions.
An example of a weaker assumption is the existence of a mildly hard predicate. We say that a predicate is mildly hard if for some xed > 0 no circuit of size 2 n can decide the predicate on more than a fraction 1?1=poly(n) of the inputs. Nisan and Wigderson prove that mild hardness su ces to derive a pseudorandom generator with seed of O(log 2 n) length, which in turn implies a quasi-polynomial deterministic simulation of BPP. This result is proved by using Yao's XOR Lemma Yao82] (see, e.g., GNW95] for a proof) to convert a mildly hard predicate over n inputs into one which has input size n 2 and is hard to compute on a fraction 1=2 + 2 ? (n) of the inputs. A series of subsequent papers attacks the problem of obtaining stronger pseudorandom generators starting from weaker and weaker assumptions. Babai et al. BFNW93] show that a predicate of worst-case circuit complexity 2 (n) can be converted into a mildly hard one. 3 Impagliazzo Imp95] proves a derandomized XOR Lemma which implies that a mildly hard predicate can be converted into one that cannot be predicted on more than some constant fraction of the inputs by circuits of size 2 n . Impagliazzo and Wigderson IW97] prove that a predicate with the latter hardness condition can be transformed into one that meets the hardness requirement of NW94]. The result of IW97] relies on a di erent derandomized version of the XOR Lemma than Imp95]. Thus, the general structure of the original construction of Nisan and Wigderson NW94] has been preserved in most subsequent works, progress being achieved by improving the single components. In particular, the use of an XOR Lemma in NW94] continues, albeit in increasingly sophisticated forms, in Imp95, IW97] . Likewise, the NW generator and its original analysis have always been used in conditional derandomization results since. 4 Future progress in the area will probably require a departure from this observance of the NW methodology, or at least a certain amount of revisitation of its main parts.
In this paper, we give two new ways to build pseudorandom generators with seeds of logarithmic length. Both approaches bypass the need for the XOR Lemma, and instead use tools (such as list decoding, extractors, and pseudoentropy generators) that did not appear in the sequence of works from NW94] to IW97]. For a diagram illustrating the steps leading up to the results of IW97] and how our techniques depart from that framework, see Figure 1 . Both of our approaches are described in more detail below.
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Extremely hard Pseudorandom Generator [BFNW93] [Imp95] A Pseudoentropy Generator. Nisan and Wigderson show that when their generator is constructed using a very hard-on-average predicate, then the output of the generator is indistinguishable from the uniform distribution. It is a natural question to ask what happens if there are stronger or weaker conditions on the predicate. In this paper we consider the question of what happens if the predicate is only mildly hard. Speci cally we are interested in whether exponential average-case hardness is really necessary for direct pseudorandom generation. In this paper we rst show that, when a mildly hard predicate is used in the NW generator, then there exists a distribution having high Shannon entropy that is indistinguishable from the output of the generator. Our main result is then that, for a mildly hard predicate, a modi ed version of the NW generator has an output indistinguishable from a distribution with high min-entropy. Such a generator is essentially a \pseudoentropy generator" in the sense of H astad et al. HILL98] . The intuition behind our proof is that if a predicate is hard to compute on more than a fraction 1 ? of the inputs then there should be some subset of the inputs of density on which the predicate is very hard | this intuition is made precise by a result of Impagliazzo Imp95] . Due to the high hardness, the evaluation of the predicate in a random point of this set will be indistinguishable from a random bit. The NW generator constructed with a predicate P works by transforming an input seed s into a sequence of points x 1 ; : : :; x m from the domain of P; the output of the generator is then P(x 1 )P(x 2 ) P(x m ). For a random seed, each of the points x i is uniformly distributed, and so we expect to typically generate m points from the hard set, so that the output of the generator looks like having m bits of randomness, that is, it is indistinguishable from some other distribution having (Shannon) entropy m. The generation of the points x 1 x m can be modi ed so that the number of points landing in the hard set is sharply concentrated around its expected value m. The output of the modi ed generator is then indistinguishable from having high min-entropy. When our generator is composed with a su ciently good extractor 5 (such as the one in Tre98]) then the result is a pseudorandom generator. This is the rst construction of a pseudorandom generator based on mild average-case hardness that does not rely on hardness ampli cation. It is also the rst application of the notion of a pseudoentropy generator to the construction of PRG in the Nisan{Wigderson sense.
Remark 1 While in this paper we analyze for the rst time the Nisan-Wigderson generator under a weaker assumption than the one originally considered in NW94], there has also been some work exploring the e ect of stronger assumptions on the predicate. Impagliazzo and Wigderson IW98] show that if the predicate has certain additional properties (such as \downward self-reducibility") then one needs only a uniform hardness assumption on the predicate (rather circuit-complexity assumption). Arvind and K obler AK97] and Klivans and van Melkebeek KvM98] show that if the predicate is hard on average for nondeterministic circuits, then the output of the generator is indistinguishable from uniform for nondeterministic adversaries. Therefore it is possible to derandomize classes involving randomness and nondeterminism, such as AM. Trevisan Tre98] shows that if the predicate is chosen randomly from a distribution having certain properties, then the output is statistically close to uniform. This yields the construction of extractors that we use in our generator.
The Connection with Polynomial Reconstruction. Our second result deals with the polynomial reconstruction problem and its connection to ampli cation of hardness. In the polynomial reconstruction problem we want to design an e cient randomized algorithm that, given oracle access to a function f that has -agreement 6 an unknown low-degree polynomial p( ), computes p( ) on every input with high probability over its internal coin tosses. This problem has been studied for its applications to program checking, average case hardness results for the permanent, and random self-reducibility of complete problems in high complexity classes BF90, Lip89, GLR + 91, FF93, GS92, FL96, CPS99]. The applicability of polynomial reconstruction to hardness-randomness result has been noted by Babai et al. BFNW93] . They show how to use polynomial reconstruction in order to convert a worst-case hard predicate into a mildly hard one. As in NW94, Imp95, IW97] one can further amplify the hardness using XOR Lemmas. It is intuitively clear that a stronger reconstruction algorithm would imply a stronger hardness ampli cation result and it could be used in place of the XOR Lemma. Unfortunately, some calculations show that a polynomial reconstruction algorithm would have to work with = o(1) in order to be a viable surrogate of a XOR Lemma, but if we have access to a function f with -agreement to some polynomial p( ), where < 1=2, then p( ) is not uniquely determined and the polynomial reconstruction problem is ill-posed. On the other hand even for very small values of , there is only a small number of polynomials that are -close to any given function f, and one can conceive a generalized reconstruction procedure that having oracle access to f outputs a small number of e cient programs so that every polynomial that is -close to f is computed by one of these programs. Such a generalized reconstruction procedure has been given for the rst time only very recently by Arora and Sudan AS97]. The procedure of Arora and Sudan has a complicated analysis that relies on their di cult analysis of the low-degree test for the \highly noisy" case. In this paper we present a reconstruction procedure that works for an even wider range of parameters and has a much simpler proof. We also show that our reconstruction procedure is strong enough to imply the hardness ampli cation result of IW97] (but even the weaker procedure of Arora and Sudan AS97] would have su ced).
Preliminaries
We write U n for the uniform distribution on f0; 1g n . The statistical di erence between two random variables X and Y on a universe U is de ned to be max S U jPr X 2 S] ? Pr Y 2 S]j.
Our main objects of study are pseudorandom generators:
De nition 2 A function G: f0; 1g d ! f0; 1g n is an (s; ") pseudorandom generator if no circuit of size s can distinguish G from U n with advantage greater than ". That is, for every circuit C of size s,
We begin by recalling the Nisan{Wigderson construction of pseudorandom generators.
The Nisan{Wigderson generator
The combinatorial construction underlying the NW generator is a collection of sets with small intersections, called a design. The key property of this generator used in NW94, IW97] is that the strings x Si behave as if they are independent when they are used as inputs to a hard function. Let P: f0; 1g`! f0; 1g be any predicate. Then the NW pseudorandom generator using P is a function NW-PRG P ;m : f0; 1g d ! f0; 1g m given by NW-PRG P ;m (x) = P(x 1 )P(x 2 ) P(x m ); where (x 1 ; : : :; x m ) = NW`; m (x) The main theorem of NW94] is that if P is taken to be a su ciently hard (on average) predicate, NW-PRG P ;m is a good pseudorandom generator. The pseudorandom generators produced by this theorem can be spectacular, as the seed length d = O(`2= logm) can be much smaller than (even logarithmic in) the number of output bits if P is su ciently hard. The main drawback is that the hypothesis is also extremely strong (in that P must be very hard on average), and much work has been done to construct predicates that are strong enough for Theorem 4 based on weaker assumptions BFNW93, Imp95, IW97, IW98]. In the next section, we analyze the quality of this generator when only a mildly hard predicate is used.
Pseudorandom generators via pseudoentropy
In this section, we show how to build a pseudorandom generator out of a mildly hard predicate in a di erent (and arguably more direct) way than IW97]. Speci cally, we show how to directly build a \pseudoen-tropy generator" from a mildly hard predicate and argue that applying an extractor to its output gives a pseudorandom generator.
Using a mildly hard predicate
Intuitively, the reason the NW pseudorandom generator works is that whenever x i is a \hard instance" of P, P(x i ) is indistinguishable from a random bit. If P is very hard as in the hypothesis of Theorem 4, then almost all inputs are hard instances. Thus, with high probability all the x i 's will be hard instances and the limited dependence of the x i 's guarantees that the P(x i )'s will look simultaneously random. Now suppose that P is instead only mildly hard, in the sense that no small circuit can compute correctly on more than a 1 ? fraction of inputs, for some small but noticeable . Intuitively, this means that some fraction of the inputs are extremely hard for P. Thus, we'd expect that a fraction of the output bits of NW-PRG P ;m are indistinguishable from random, so that we should get some crude pseudorandomness out of the generator. In fact, this intuition about hard instances can be made precise, using the following result of Impagliazzo Imp95].
Theorem 5 (hardcore sets Imp95]) Suppose no circuit of size s can compute P: f0; 1g`! f0; 1g on more than a 1 ? fraction of the inputs in f0; 1g`. Then, for every " > 0, there exists an "-hardcore set H f0; 1g`such that jHj = 2`and no circuit of size s 0 = (" 2 2 s) can compute P correctly on more than a 1 2 + " fraction of the inputs in H.
Using this theorem, we can prove something about the output of NW-PRG P ;m when a mildly hard predicate P is used. Notice that if x is chosen uniformly at random, then each component x i = x Si of the output of NW`; m (x) is uniformly distributed in f0; 1g`. Hence, the expected number of x i 's that land in H is m. Thus, the earlier intuition suggests that the output of NW-PRG P ;m should have m bits of pseudorandomness, and this is in fact true.
Theorem 6 Suppose no circuit of size s can compute P: f0; 1g`! f0; 1g on more than a 1 ? fraction of the inputs in f0; 1g`. Then, for every " > 0, there is a distribution D on f0; 1g m of (Shannon) entropy 7 at least m such that no circuit of size s 0 = (" 2 =m 2 ) s ? O(m 2 logm) can distinguish the output of NW-PRG P ;m : f0; 1g d ! f0; 1g m from D with advantage greater than ".
Proof: Let H be a ("= m)-hardcore set for P, as given by Theorem 5. We will show that the following distribution satis es the requirements of the theorem. m Using an averaging argument we can x r i+1 ; : : :; r m , b, and all the bits of x outside S i while preserving the prediction advantage. Renaming x Si as z, we now observe that z varies uniformly over H while P(x Sj ) for j < i and Q(x Sj ; r j ) for j > i are now functions P j of z that depend on only jS i \ S j j log m bits of z. So, we have Pr z C (P 1 (z) P i?1 (z)bP i+1 (z) P m (z)) b = P(z)] > 1 2 + " m :
Each P j can be computed by a circuit of size O(m logm), since every function of log m bits can be computed by a circuit of that size. Incorporating these circuits and b into C, we obtain a circuit C 0 of size size(C) + O(m 2 log m) such that Pr z C 0 (z) = P(z)] > 1 2 + " m . Now, since H is ("= m)-hardcore for P as in Theorem 5, C 0 must have size greater than ( 2 (" 2 = m) 2 ) s = (" 2 =m 2 ) s, and hence C must have size greater than (" 2 =m 2 ) s ? O(m 2 log m).
Thus, using a mildly hard predicate with the NW generator, we can obtain many bits of crude pseudorandomness. A natural next step would be to try to \extract" this crude pseudorandomness and obtain an output that is indistinguishable from the uniform distribution. Unfortunately, one cannot hope to extract uniformly distributed bits from a distribution that just has high Shannon entropy. Extraction is only possible from distributions that have high min-entropy. Recall that a distribution D on a nite set S is said to have min-entropy k if for all x 2 D, Pr X = x] 2 ?k .
The reason that we were only able to argue about Shannon entropy in Theorem 6 is that we could only say that m x i 's land in H on average. To obtain a result about min-entropy, we would need to guarantee that many x i 's lie in H with high probability. Clearly, this would be the case if the x i 's were generated pairwise independently instead of via the NW generator. But we also need the special properties of the NW generator to make the current argument about indistinguishability work. Following IW97], we resolve this dilemma by taking the XOR of the two generators to obtain a new generator with the randomness properties of each. 9 That is, we obtain x 1 ; : : :; x m from a seed x using the NW generator, we obtain y 1 ; : : :; y m pairwise independent from a seed y, and then use z 1 = x 1 y 1 ; : : :; z m = x m y m as the inputs to the predicate P. As we will prove shortly, this gives a generator whose output is indistinguishable from some distribution with high min-entropy, as desired.
3.2 A pseudoentropy generator. Remark 8 The above de nition di ers from that of HILL98] in several ways. Most importantly, we require the output to be indistinguishable from having high min-entropy, whereas they only require that it be indistinguishable from having high Shannon entropy. They later convert to the Shannon entropy to minentropy by taking many samples on independent seeds, but we cannot a ord the extra randomness needed to do this. Other di erences are that we ask for indistinguishability against circuits rather than uniform adversaries, that we do not require that G be computable in polynomial time, and that we do not explicitly ask that k be larger than d (though the notion is uninteresting otherwise).
Recall that we need a way of generating many pairwise independent strings from a short seed.
Lemma 9 ( CG89] (see also Gol97a])) For any`2 N and m 2`, there is a generator PI`; m : f0; 1g 3`! (f0; 1g`) m such that for y selected uniformly at random, the random variables PI`; m (y) 1 ; : : :; PI`; m (y) m are pairwise independent. Moreover PI`; m is computable in time poly(`; m).
Let P: f0; 1g`! f0; 1g be any predicate, let m be any positive integer, and let d be the seed length of NW`; m . Then our pseudoentropy generator using P is a function PE P ;m : f0; 1g d+3`! f0; 1g m given by PE P ;m (x; y) = P(x 1 y 1 )P(x 2 y 2 ) P(x m y m ); where (x 1 ; : : :; x m ) = NW`; m (x) and (y 1 ; : : :; y m ) = PI`; m (y)
9 IW97] take the XOR of the NW generator with a generator coming from a random walk on an expander. 
Extracting the randomness
The tool we will use to transform our pseudoentropy generator into a pseudorandom generator is an extractor. The following lemma con rms the intuition that applying an extractor to a distribution that is computationally indistinguishable from a distribution with high min-entropy should yield a distribution that is indistinguishable from uniform.
Lemma 13 Suppose G: f0; 1g d1 ! f0; 1g m is a (k; s; " 1 ) pseudoentropy generator and Ext: f0; 1g m f0; 1g d2 ! f0; 1g n is a (k; " 2 )-extractor computable by circuits of size t. Then G 0 : f0; 1g d1+d2 ! f0; 1g n de ned by G 0 (u; v) = Ext(G(u); v) is a (s ? t; " 1 + " 2 ) pseudorandom generator.
Proof: Let D be the distribution of min-entropy k that cannot be distinguished from G(U d1 ). Suppose C: f0; 1g n ! f0; 1g is a circuit of size s?t that distinguishes G 0 (U d1 ; U d2 ) from uniform with advantage greater where the second-to-last inequality follows from the fact that Ext(D; U d2 ) and U m have statistical di erence at most " 2 . Now, by an averaging argument, the second argument of C 0 can be xed to some v 2 f0; 1g d2
to obtain a circuit C 00 (x) = C(x; v) of size at most s which distinguishes G(U d1 ) from D with advantage greater than " 1 . This is a contradiction.
Summing up, we have the following theorem:
Theorem 14 There is a universal constant > 0 such that the following holds. Let P: f0; 1g`! f0; 1g be any predicate such that no circuit of size s can compute P correctly on more than a 1 ? fraction of the inputs, where s 2`and s ? . De ne n = s and m = 2n 2 = and let PE P ;m : f0; 1g d1 ! f0; 1g m be the ( m=2; (1= 2 m 4 ) s?O(m 2 logm); O(1= m)) pseudoentropy generator of Theorem 10 and let Ext: f0; 1g m f0; 1g d2 ! f0; 1g n be the ( m=2; 1= m)-extractor of Theorem 12. Let PE-PRG P : f0; 1g d1+d2 ! f0; 1g n be de ned by PE-PRG P (u; v) = Ext(PE P ;m (u); v).
Then, PE-PRG P is a (s 0 Moreover, PE-PRG P can be evaluated in time 2 O(`2= log s) with O(n 2 = ) oracle calls to P.
In particular, suppose P is a predicate in E such that no circuit of size s = 2 `c an compute P correctly on more than a 1 ? = 1 ? 1=poly(`) fraction of the inputs. Then the output length is n = 2 (`) , the seed length is O(`) = O(log n), no circuit of size s 0 = 2 (`) can distinguish the output from uniform, and the generator can be evaluated in time poly(n), so the resulting pseudorandom generator is su ciently strong to obtain P = BPP.
Proof: 
Remark 15 As mentioned earlier, H astad et al. HILL98] introduced the notion of a pseudoentropy genera-
tor and showed that the crude pseudorandomness of such a generator can be extracted to yield a pseudorandom generator. Their work is in the \cryptographic" setting, in which the generators must be computable in time polynomial in the seed length and hence one can only hope for the output to be polynomially longer than the seed (rather than exponentially, as we obtain). Hence throughout their construction they can a ord super-linear increases in seed length, whereas preserving the seed length up to linear factors is crucial for obtaining pseudorandom generators good enough for P = BPP. For example, they can a ord to use randomness-ine cient extractors such as 2-universal hash functions, whereas we require extractors which use only a logarithmic number of truly random bits, which have only been constructed recently Zuc96, Tre98] . 10 Remark 16 The output of the pseudoentropy generator PE P ;m constructed in Theorem 10 is actually \nicer" than stated. Speci cally, it is indistinguishable from a oblivious bit-xing source | that is, a distribution on strings of length m in which m ? k bit positions are xed and the other k bit positions vary uniformly and independently. Such sources were the focus of the \bit extraction problem" studied in Vaz85, BBR85, CGH + 85, Fri92] and the term \oblivious bit-xing source" was introduced in CW89]. To see that the output of PE P ;m is indistinguishable from an oblivious bit-xing source, simply observe that the distribution D given in the proof of Theorem 10 is such a source. 11 Extracting from oblivious bit-xing sources in which all but k bits are xed is an easier task than extracting from a general source of min-entropy k, and already in CW89] there are (implicitly) extractors su cient for our purposes.
Algebraic ampli cation of hardness
Recall the main theorem of Nisan and Wigderson (Theorem 4) that states that given a hard predicate P: f0; 1g`! f0; 1g, one can get a pseudorandom generator. The requirement of a hard predicate P in this theorem can be replaced with a requirement of a hard function (with many bits of output) using 10 Indeed, the term \extractor" was not even present at the time of HILL98] and the rst constructions of randomness-e cient extractors used their Leftover Hash Lemma as a starting point. 11 Actually, D is a convex combination of oblivious bit-xing sources. Distribution X is said to be a convex combination of distributions X 1 ; : : : ; Xt if there is a distribution on I on f1; : : : ; tg such that X can be realized by choosing i 2 f1; : : : ; tg according to I, taking a sample x from X i , and outputting x. It is easy to see that any extractor for oblivious bit-xing sources also works for convex combinations of them. the hardcore predicate construction of Goldreich and Levin GL89] (see also Gol97b]). Given a function g: f0; 1g k ! f0; 1g`, the hardcore predicate for g is the function GL g : f0; 1g k+`! f0; 1g given by GL g (x; r) = hg(x); ri; for x 2 f0; 1g k and r 2 f0; 1g`; where hu; vi denotes the mod-2 inner product of u = (u 1 ; : : :; u`) and v = (v 1 ; : : :; v`) (i.e., P`i =1 u i v i (mod 2)).
Theorem 17 ( GL89]) There exists a constant c s.t. the following holds. If g: f0; 1g k ! f0; 1g`is a function such that no circuit of size s can compute g correctly on more than an " fraction of the inputs, then GL g : f0; 1g k+`! f0; 1g is a predicate such that no circuit of size s 0 = (( " k`) c s) can compute P correctly on more than a fraction 1 2 + 2" of the inputs. Thus the two theorems above show that it su ces to construct hard functions to obtain pseudorandom generators. The approach of Impagliazzo and Wigderson is to start from a predicate P that is hard in the worst case (i.e., no small circuit computes it correctly on all inputs); then to use a low-degree extension of P to obtain a polynomial functionp that is mildly hard on the average. They then apply two di erent XOR lemmas to obtain a functions that grow harder; eventually obtaining as hard a function as required in Theorem 17. We use an alternate approach for this sequence by showing directly that the functionp above is very hard; as hard as required for the combination of Theorems 4 and 17. We start by specifying the properties of the low-degree extension.
Proposition 18 For every ,`and predicate P: f0; 1g`! f0; 1g, there exists m, d 2 N, a eld F, and a polynomialp: F m ! F (the low-degree extension) of total degree d satisfying the following properties:
1. m log jFj 4`, d jFj , and jFj poly(`= ).
2. If T P and Tp denote the worst-case computation times (or circuit sizes) for P andp respectively, then T P Tp poly(2`T P ) (p is harder than P but not too much harder, especially if P has time complexity 2 O(`) .)
Proof: Pick a eld F of cardinality approximately`2 2 ; and a subset H F of cardinality maxf`; 1 g and set m =l og jHj and let b: f0; 1g`! H m be any injective map. Letp: F m ! F be a polynomial of degree at most jHj in each of the m variables satisfyingp(b(x)) = P(x) for every x 2 f0; 1g`. (Such a function does exist and can be found easily.) For this setting it may be veri ed that all the conditions required above are satis ed.
In the following sections we prove the following theorem. Putting together the above we get:
Theorem 20 There exists a universal constant > 0 such that the following holds: Let P: f0; 1g`! f0; 1g be a function that is not computed by any circuit of size s, where s 2`. Let m; d; F;p be as guaranteed to exist by Proposition 18 for = s ?7 . Let`0 = 4`+log jFj and Q: f0; 1g`0 ! f0; 1g be given by Q = GLp (wherê p is now viewed as a function from 4`bits to log jFj bits). Then, for n = s , NW-PRG Q 0 ;n : f0; 1g t ! f0; 1g n is an (s 0 ; ") pseudorandom generator with output length = n = s seed length = t = O `2 log s adversary size = s 0 = p s adversary's maximum advantage = " = O(1=n 2 ); Moreover, PE-PRG P can be evaluated in time 2 O(`2= log s) with access to the entire truth table of P. Theorem 22 There exists a constant c such that the reconstruction problem above can be solved in time poly(md log jFj="), with the running time of each of the oracle machines listed in the output being poly(md log jFj="), De nition 25 The line through x; y 2 F m , denoted l x;y , is the parametrized set of points fl x;y (t) def = (1 ? t)x + ty j t 2 Fg. Given a function f: F m ! F, f restricted to the line l x;y is the function fj lx;y : F ! F given by fj lx;y (t) = f(l x;y (t)).
Notice that if f is a polynomial of total degree d, then fj lx;y (t) is a univariate polynomial of degree at most d. Our strategy, to reconstruct the value of p at a point x, is to look at a random line going through x. On this line p turns into a univariate polynomial. Furthermore, the random line through the randomly chosen point x is a \pairwise independent" collection of points from F m . Thus p and f will have agreement close to on this line as well. Thus the goal of nding p(x) \reduces" to the goal of reconstructing p restricted to this line, i.e., a univariate reconstruction problem, a problem that has been addressed in ALRS92, Sud97, GS98]. In particular, we use the following theorem. We describe a family of reconstruction procedures, fM z;a g z2F m ;a2F , that will be used to construct the machines M 1 ; : : :; M k . To gain some intuition into the procedure below, it may be helpful to consider only the machines M z;p(z) . The machines take as parameters a positive real number ", integers d and m, and a eld F. Remark 27 1.
Step 1 above can be computed in time polynomial in 1=", log jFj and d as follows: If F is small enough, then we let t 1 ; : : :; t n be all the elements of F and invoke Theorem 26 on the set f(t i ; f(l z;x (t i )))g n i=1 with k = "n=2. (Note that k > p 2dn as long as " > 2 p d=jFj, which is true by hypothesis.) If F is too large to do this, then set n = poly(d=") and pick t 1 ; : : :; t n distinct at random from F and then invoking Theorem 26 on the set f(t i ; f(l z;x (t i )))g n i=1 with k = "n=4. Since there are at most 4=" polynomials with agreement at least "=2 with fj lz;x (by the \furthermore" part of Theorem 26), the choice of n guarantees that with high probability, all of these polynomials agree with fj lz;x on at least "n=4 of the t i 's. As the choice of n also guarantees that k = ("n=4) > p 2dn, Theorem 26 yields a list containing all polynomials with agreement at least "=2. Now, we wish to discard all polynomials with agreement less than "=4 | this can be accomplished by comparing each polynomial g obtained with fj lz;x on a random sample of poly(1=") points from F and discarding it if it has agreement smaller than "=3 on this sample. 2. The number of polynomials output in Step 1 above is at most 8=" (by the \furthermore" part of Theorem 26.)
To shed some light on the steps above: We expect that pj lz;x is one of the g i 's returned in Step (1) above. In Step (2) we try to nd out which g i to use by checking to see if there is a unique one which has g i (0) = a (recall that pj lz;x (0) = p(z)), and if so we use this polynomial to output p(x) = pj lz;x (1) = g i (1). This intuition is made precise in the Section 4.2. We now nish the description of the reconstruction procedure.
Reconstruction algorithm.
{ Repeat the following O(log(1=")) several times: Proof: For the polynomial pj lz;x not to be included in the output list it has to be the case that p and f do not have "=2 agreement on the line l z;x . But the line is a pairwise independent collection of jFj points in F m . The quantity of interest then is the probability that a random variable with expectation " attains an average of at most "=2 on jFj samples. Using Chebychev's inequality, this probability may be bounded by Proof: For convenience in this argument, assume that M z;p(z) nds all polynomials of agreement at least "=4 with fj lz;x rather than just a subset, as that is clearly the worst case for the claim. Now, instead of picking x and z at random and then letting g 1 ; : : :; g l be all degree d polynomials with "=4 agreement with fj lz;x , we rst pick z 0 ; x 0 independently and uniformly at random from F m ; and let g 0 1 ; : : :; g 0 l 0 be all univariate degree d polynomials with "=4 agreement with fj l z 0 ;x 0 . We now pick two distinct elements t 1 ; t 2 uniformly from F and let z = l z 0 ;x 0(t 1 ) and x = l z 0 ;x 0(t 2 ). Notice that we can express z 0 = l z;x ((t 2 ? t 1 ) ?1 t 2 ) and x 0 = l z;x ((t 2 ? t 1 ) ?1 (t 2 ? 1)). Thus the lines l z;x and l z 0 ;x 0 contain the same set of points and thus the polynomials g i (t) def = g 0 i (t 2 +t (t 1 ?t 2 )) are exactly the set of polynomials with "=4 agreement with fj lz;x . Thus the event \pj lz;x 6 = g j and pj lz;x (0) = g j (0)" is equivalent to the event \pj l x 0 ;z 0 6 = g 0 j and pj l x 0 ;z 0 (t 1 ) = g 0 j (t 1 )", where t 1 is being chosen at random. This probability is at most d jFj for any xed j and thus the probability that there exists a j s.t pj l x 0 ;z 0 (t 1 ) = g 0 j (t 1 ) is at most l d jFj . From l 8 " and 1 " 32 p d=jFj, the claim follows.
Discounting for the two possible bad events considered in Claims 29 and 30, we nd that with probability at least 1 ? 1 32 , there exists a polynomial g i returned in
Step 1 of M z;p(z) such that g i = pj lz;x ; furthermore, this is the unique polynomial such that g i (0) = pj lz;x (0) = p(z). Thus the output is g i (1) = pj lz;x (1) = p(x).
Thus with probability at least 31=32, we nd that for a random pair (z; x), M z;p(z) computes p(x). An application of Markov's inequality now yields the desired result.
Lemma 31 With probability at least 1 ? 1 64 , one of the polynomials reconstructed in any one execution of
Step 3 of Reconstruction Algorithm is pj lz;y ; and thus one of the oracles created in Step 4 is Corr M z;p(z) , provided jFj is large enough.
Proof: As in Claim 29 we argue that p and f have at least "=2 agreement on the line l z;y and then pj lz;y is one of the polynomials output in this step. Thus one of the oracles created is Corr Mz;a for a = pj lz;y (0) = p(z).
Proof of Theorem 22: Fix any degree d polynomial p with " agreement with f. Combining Lemmas 28 and 31 we nd that with probability 31=64, one of the oracles output by the reconstruction algorithm is Corr M z;p(z) ; and z is such that M z;p(z) computes p(x) for at least 15=16 fraction of x's in F m ; and thus (by Theorem 24) Corr M z;p(z) computes p on every input.
Repeating the loop O(log 1 " ) times ensures that every polynomial p with " agreement with f is included in the output with high probability, using the well-known bound that there are only O(1=") such polynomials (cf., GRS98, Theorem 17]).
